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The Fourth Circuit further noted
that the district court's determination
that Mark received
substantial educational benefit in
the regular classroom was contrary
to the administrative
findings that Mark made no
academic progress in that setting.
Therefore, the district court's
decision to ignore the hearing
officer's evaluation, the Fourth
Circuit pointed out, went against the
legal principle that state proceedings
must command considerable
deference in federal court.
While the Fourth Circuit recognized that the IDEA's mainstreaning
provision established a presumption
of inclusion, it found that presumption ultimately subordinate to the
main goal that disabled children
receive some educational benefit.
Therefore, the findings of state
proceedings must be considered to
accurately assess what will confer
the best educational benefit on the
disabled child.
IDEA Does Not Guarantee

Maximum Benefits to the
Handicapped Child
In reaching its conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit realized that IDEA
requires disabled children to be
educated along with non-handicapped children "to the maximum
extent appropriate" but it does not
require a county to provide "every
special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's

potential." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
Similarly, the IDEA does not require
that every special education provider
possess "every conceivable credential relevant to evey child's disability." It would be economically
unfeasible and equally unrealistic to
expect every school system to have
the highest accredited educators.
Using this reasoning, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed the dictrict court's
conclusions that county efforts were
insufficient to educate Mark in the
regular classroom due to inadequately trained personnel. The
Fourth Circuit deemed this theory
inconsistent with the law and with
the record. Premier credentials are

not required under IDEA and the
record revealed each of Mark's IEP
team members' credentials were at
least adequate.
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
held that since the state educational
facilities and not the court, are in the
best position to assess educational
policy, a court must give preference
to state administrative findings in
determinining the most appropriate
educational program. These findings
may include information which can
override the IDEA's mainstreaming
provision calling for the presumption for inclusion. In addition, the
Fourth Circuit held that the IDEA
mainstreaming provision does not
require schools to provide a staff
possessing the most optimum of
credentials, or to provide the
absolute most beneficial program
for a "best case" scenario. In this
case, the Board satisfied the
mainstreaming directive of the
IDEA by its enthusiastic steps to
organize a qualified staff, and the
Board's active attempts to tailor a
program to fit Mark's needs.

Internet Service Providers Immune from
Liability for Third Party Defamation
by Lynn Middendorf
The Communications Decency
Act of 1996 ("CDA") protects
computer service providers from
liability for information that
originates from third parties. In
Zeran v.America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), Kenneth
Zeran brought a negligence claim
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against AOL for posting a false
message from a third party. The
Fourth Circuit, ruling that Section
230 immunizes computer service
providers from liability for publishing information from third parties,
reaffirmed a judgment on the
pleadings.

On April 25, 1995, an unknown
person placed an advertisement on
an AOL bulletin board for "Naughty
Oklahoma T-shirts". The message
listed Kenneth Zeran's phone
number for inquiries. These T-shirts
alluded to the April 19, 1995
Oklahoma City bombing in a
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distasteful and offensive manner. As
a result of this message, Zeran
received numerous angry and
threatening phone calls. When Zeran
called AOL about the situation, it
informed him that it would remove
but could not retract the message.
The following day, an unidentified
person posted another defamatory
message. Again, Zeran received a
large number of phone messages and
death threats, from incensed callers.
Zeran informed the FBI and secured
police protection for his home.
For four more days, messages
continued to be posted advertising
additional items, including bumper
stickers and key chains. AOL
responded, after Zeran's numerous
phone calls, by assuring him that it
would close the account. An
Oklahoma City radio station further
exacerbated the incident by relaying
the AOL posting to its listeners and
encouraging them to call Zeran and
voice their anger. On May 14, after
an Oklahoma newspaper eventually
revealed that the postings were a
hoax and the radio station broadcasted an on-air apology, the phone
calls subsided to approximately
fifteen calls per day.
In April 1996, Zeran filed a
negligence suit against AOL alleging
liability for posting such defamatory
messages, not removing them in a
timely manner, and not screening
against such behavior. In response,
AOL denied liability and asserted an
affirmative defense under 47 U.S.C.
Section 230, the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"). AOL
then moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, which the district court
granted.
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Court Rejects Argument That
Service Providers are Distributors, Not Publishers
In asserting Section 230 as an
affirmative defense, AOL argued
that Congress intended to shield
computer service providers from
liability for information posted by
third parties. Section 230 states: "No
provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another
information content provider." 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Moreover, the
section also defines "interactive
computer service" as
"any information service,
system, or access software
provider that provides or
enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically
a service or system that
provides access to the
Internet and such systems
operated or services offered
by libraries or educational
institutions?' 47 U.S.C. §
230(e)(2).
Both parties agreed that AOL
satisfied the definition of an
interactive computer service.
Zeran argued that Section 230
only abolished liability for publishers and that the computer service
was a distributor, not a publisher.
According to Zeran, Congress only
used the term "publisher" in Section
230 to make the distinction that
immunity did not extend to distributors under Section 230. Therefore,
computer service providers incur
liability if they distribute defamatory
or offensive material that the

computer service provider is aware
that such offensive material exists on
their service. Consequently, a
publisher protected by Section 230,
would not incur liability for publishing such offensive materials. Since a
distributor does not incur liability
for distributing offensive material in
the absence of some proof that the
distributor knew that the information
distributed contained offensive
material, Zeran argued that AOL was
a distributor. Zeran also argued that
he notified AOL that its bulletin
board contained offensive material.
Thus, Zeran claimed AOL should be
liable for the defamatory information it posted about Zeran on April
25, 1995. Moreover, Zeran insisted
that AOL should have screened for
other defamatory messages; because
of these actions, Zeran alleged AOL
should be liable for every future
defamatory message posted.
The court, however, rejected
Zeran's argument and ruled that
AOL does indeed satisfy the
definition of a publisher. In reaching
its decision, the court examined the
language of the rules regarding
defamation as well as the definitions
of "publisher" and "distributor."
Referring to Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 113 (5th ed.
1984), the court reasoned that
everyone involved with a publication
is a publisher, including distributors.
Moreover, publishing constitutes the
inclusion of defamatory material and
the failure to remove such material.
The court further stated that even the
repetition of defamatory material
constitutes publication. The court
observed that AOL practiced the
traditional functions of a publisher,
namely editing, withdrawing and
changing the content of its bulletin
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boards where it posted messages.
Given the facts of the case, the court
characterized AOL as a publisher
and thus held AOL immune from
liability for publishing defamatory
information from a third party under
Section 230. Thus, the court
affirmed the summary judgment.

Court Examined Congress'
Purpose in Creating § 230
The court interpreted Section 230
to prohibit third party defamation
lawsuits against computer service
providers acting as publishers.
Having determined that AOL was
indeed a publisher, the court also
analyzed the language of Section
230 in order to understand the
purpose of such a prohibition. The
court looked to the legislative intent
of Section 230 and determined that
Congress had several purposes for
creating an act such as the CDA.
Section 230 continued the vigorous
activity of Internet conmunication
while keeping government regulations within the industry to a
minimum. Congress recognized the
potential of the Internet as a unique
medium for political, cultural and
educational development and
desired for such a medium to grow.
Congress also intended for the
Internet to continue its growth with
little government regulation.
Similarly, Congress recognized
that these computer service providers communicated a great deal of
information to millions of users.
With such a vast amount of information, offensive postings were
possible and computer service
providers might incur liability for
their publication. Yet, it would be

214 * Loyola Consumer Law Review

nearly impossible for service
providers to screen all user postings.
Congress realized that if service
providers screened all postings, a
significant limitation on both the
amount and substance of the
postings would result. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that
Congress immunized service
providers from defamation liability
in order to avoid such potentially
harsh limitations.
The Fourth Circuit explained that
another significant purpose of
Section 230 promotes self-regulation
of offensive material among the
service providers. The court maintained that Congress passed Section
230 as a response to the decision in
Stratton Oalmnont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y Misc. LEXIS
229 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1995). In
Stratton, the New York court ruled
that computer service providers that
regulated the material submitted to
their services and permitted the
dissemination of offensive materials
on their services were similar to
original publishers and they took a
risk in subjecting themselves to
liability. Fearing such expansive
liability, service providers were less
aggressive in restricting inappropriate or offensive postings. In response, Congress passed Section
230. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned, Congress enacted Section
230 to remove the disincentive of
self-regulation established by the
Stratton decision.
Court Recognized Practical
Concerns With Notice
Liability
According to the court, "notice

liability" occurs when a distributor
incurs liability for distributing
offensive and defamatory material
after notice is given that the material
distributed is either offensive or
defamatory. Zeran's argument stated
that AOL, as a distributor, received
notice of the offensive posting, and
incurred distributor liability. In
response, the court asserted that
enforcement of such liability would
not be pragmatic. This defeated
Congress' intent in passing Section
230. First, the court pointed out that
if service providers incurred liability
as distributors, they incur liability
every time they receive notice of
potentially defamatory postings.
Due to the vast amount of information available on the Internet through
these providers, the court reasoned
that to make the providers screen
each message posted, and make
quick editorial decisions about each
message would be a huge burden on
the providers. Consequently, this
detrimentally effects freedom of
speech on the Internet.
Second, the court explained that
providers invite liability if they
attempt to scrutinize postings and
block any offensive material. Under
a notice liability application, an
investigation on behalf of the service
provider leads to notice of offensive
material more often. Consequently,
the service provider opens themselves to further liability. This kind
of notice liability discourages
service providers from investigating
and regulating at all. The court
reasoned that Congress attempted to
avoid this type of scenario.
Finally, the court also reasoned
that holding service providers to the
notice liability standard of a
distributor would exacerbate

Volume 10, number 3

Recent Cases

litigation against service providers.
With such a standard, the service
providers incur liability any time any
one of its subscribers notified it that
he or she was bothered by another
party's posting. Consequently,
deciding what information was
derogatory, defamatory or offensive
burdens providers. Again, the court
concluded that such a consequence
of notice liability was contrary to
Congress's intent to encourage selfregulation.
CourtAlso Rejected Claim
That § 230 Cannot BeApplied Retroactively
Zeran argued that the law did not
apply retroactively in this case
because the cause of action predated
it. Congress enacted the CDA and it

became effective February 8, 1996.
Zeran filed his claim on April 23,
1996, nearly a year after the original
posting of the defamatory message.
The court, however, disagreed with
Zeran. The court decided that
Congress felt so strongly about the
need to protect free speech on the
Internet and the need to encourage
self-regulation that Section 230
immediately applied on any claim
brought forward since its enactment.
The court also examined this case
in light of the framework of
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S.
Ct. 1483 (1994). The decision in
Landgrafasserted that for preenactment events, the courts must
decide whether Congress effectively
stated what the statute's reach should
be. In applying this to Section 230,

the Fourth Circuit ruled that
Congress unquestionably designed
the statute to apply to any claim
filed after the statute's enactment,
even if the cause of action occurred
prior to that date. Thus, the court
concluded that retroactivity was not
an issue in this case.
After considering Congress's
purpose in enacting Section 230 and
examining the language of the
statute, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
liability did not extend to AOL for
offensive material posted on their
service by a third party. The court
determined that AOL was a publisher and that Section 230 protected
AOL. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the judgment on the
pleadings in favor of AOL.

Posting Information on Internet Does Not
Establish Personal Jurisdiction
by Zachary Raimi
The rise of the Internet, which
has dramatically changed the way
people communicate and conduct
business, has impacted the law and
legal proceedings. In Cybersell,Inc.
v. Cybersell,Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th
Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held
that an Arizona court could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over a
Florida corporation, which advertised over the Internet, when it used
Plaintiff's trademark on an Internet
site. The court determined that, even
though Internet users could access
the company's web page in Arizona,
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a company may not be sued unless it
takes affirmative steps to avail itself
to the laws and benefits of that state.

Two Companies
Same Name -

-

With

Clash Over

Trademark Infringement,
Jurisdiction
On January 9, 1996, Cybersell,
Inc. ("Cybersell AZ"), an Arizona
corporation, sued Cybersell, Inc., a
Florida corporation ("Cybersell
FU'), in a federal district court in

Arizona. Cybersell AZ alleged that
Cybersell FL engaged in "trademark
infringement, unfair competition,
fraud, and RICO violations."
Cybersell FL sought dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The
court granted Cybersell FL's motion,
and Cybersell AZ appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
The lawsuit traces its history to
May 1994, when Cybersell AZ was
incorporated to provide Internet
advertising and marketing services.
On August 8, 1994, Cybersell AZ
applied for the service mark
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